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ABSTRACT

Issues concerning administrator evaluation at the University of Toledo, including internal political realities and the need to incorporate qualitative dimensions, were evaluated. The overall framework for the analysis of administrator evaluation at Toledo was based on the political model of J. Victor Baldridge (1971), complemented by Bacharach and Lawler's (1980) discussion of politics and power, and by Pirsig's (1974) concept of quality. Baldridge's posits five points of analysis: social structure or context, interest articulation processes, legislative transformation, policy outcomes, and policy executions. Based on a description of the activities of the university's faculty senate and the administration in regard to administrator evaluation, it is suggested that neither the administration nor the faculty senate wanted to pursue administration evaluation as part of a general institutional commitment to uniform assessment. The social structure at the University of Toledo is complex and under stress, and the process of interest articulation was inhibited by antagonism in the institution's social structure. Economic issues, especially the related issues of collective bargaining and differential salaries, were largely responsible for the antagonism. Committee members who negotiated about which interests would be translated into policies had very limited power. It is suggested that the efforts to consider a policy for administrator evaluation were preliminary stages that did not result in policy development or execution. There was also a failure to come to terms with, or achieve consensus about, the issue of quality. A bibliography is appended. (SW)

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Politics and Quality in Administrator Evaluation

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This paper was presented at the Twenty-First Annual Forum of the Association for Institutional Research held at the Leamington Hotel in Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 17-20, 1981. This paper was reviewed by the AIR Forum Publications Committee and was judged to be of high quality and of interest to others concerned with the research of higher education. It has therefore been selected to be included in the ERIC Collection of Forum Papers.

Mary Corcoran
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(Editor, AIR Forum Publications)

The evaluation of administrators is still in a primitive stage, despite the fact that many recent publications have addressed the topic. Two aspects of the evaluation process--internal institutional politics and quality, not quantity, as a dimension of both the evaluation process itself and the performance of administrators--have not received the attention they must if administrator evaluation is to be effective. A case study of administrator evaluation at The University of Toledo, a process grounded in an awareness of internal political realities and an understanding of the need to incorporate qualitative dimensions, has important implications for practitioners and theoreticians.

The evaluation of administrators is still in a primitive stage, despite the fact that many recent publications have addressed the topic. Two aspects of the evaluation process have not received the attention they must if administrator evaluation is to be effective. These aspects are internal institutional politics, and quality, not quantity, as a dimension of both the evaluation process itself and the performance of administrators. The process of administrator evaluation at The University of Toledo is examined in this paper. The study is grounded in an analysis of internal political realities and an understanding of the need to account for qualitative dimensions of administrative processes.

LITERATURE

Two recent bibliographies indicate that there is a wide range of professional literature on administrator evaluation. The Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) Clearinghouse on Higher Education has published "Administrator Evaluation, " a 112 entry annotated bibliography, and Farmer (1979a) also includes a short, but quite useful annotated bibliography in his comprehensive volume. The literature can be divided into six categories.

First, volumes edited by Fisher (1978a) and Farmer (1979a) exemplify wide-ranging works in which different authors write about selected aspects of administrator evaluation. Second, chapters by Dressel (1976) and Miller (1979) are best characterized as general discussions or think pieces. Third, Anderson (1975) and Genova, Madoff, Chin, and Thomas (1976) present "cook-books" for structuring evaluation. The strengths and weaknesses of ratings scales, the subject of the fourth category, are discussed by Hillway (1973) and Farmer (1979b), among others. The fifth category, case studies, is illustrated by Brown (1978), Hays (1976), and Fenker (1975). Sixth, volumes by Fisher (1978b) and Nordvall

(1979) illustrate the many works that intimately link administrator evaluation to administrator development.

This categorization correctly hints that the professional literature on administrator evaluation is varied and multitudinous. One seeks in vain, however, for any substantive political analysis which deals explicitly with the manipulation and distribution of power, and the struggle for power may be the heart of the process. One also seeks in vain for any explicit consideration of the quality of the process. The analysis in the current paper addresses these issues. A basic assumption of this paper is that the attempt to formulate equitable, consistent, worthwhile, and feasible systems of administrator evaluation will in the long run be frustrated unless they are grounded in a sympathetic understanding of power politics and quality.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

The overarching framework for the analysis of administrator evaluation at The University of Toledo is provided by the political model described (1971) and later modified (1978) by J. Victor Baldridge. The framework is complemented by Bacharach and Lawler's (1980) discussion of politics and power, and by Pirsig's (1974) concept of quality. Baldridge's original model has five points of analysis: social structure or context, interest articulation processes, legislative transformation, policy outcomes, and policy executions. Baldridge (1971) says this about the points of analysis.

Social structure is "a configuration of social groups with basically different life-styles and political interests. The crucial point is that the differences often lead to conflict, for what is in the interest of one group may damage another" (p. 23).

The articulation of interests by each of the participant groups makes up the second stage of the model. Baldridge says, "Groups with conflicting values

and goals must somehow translate them into effective influence if they are to obtain favorable action by legislative bodies" (p. 23).

The "dynamics by which articulated interests are translated into policies" constitutes the legislative stage. At this point, "claims are played off against one another, negotiations are undertaken . . . committees meet . . . and powerful people 'higgle and haggle' about the eventual policy" (pp. 23-24).

The successful completion of the legislative stage should lead to policy formulation. This is "the official climax to the conflict and represents an authoritative, binding decision to commit the organization to one set of possible alternative actions, to one set of goals and values" (p. 24).

Finally, policy must be implemented. In some cases this results in routine implementation; in others, attempts to implement policy result in a new round of interest articulation, or the groups involved in the process "feed back" their interests and concerns into a revised implementation process.

Baldridge (1971) develops his political model and compares selected aspects to the same aspects of bureaucratic and collegial models. Differences between and among the models in terms of two aspects have important implications for the current study: the view of decision making, and goal setting and policy.

First, decision making is viewed as a matter of negotiation, bargaining, and political influence processes in a political model. A bureaucratic model suggests decision making is a rational process constrained by formal bureaucratic procedures. A collegial model posits that decision making involves shared, collegial decisions.

Second, political models place the emphasis of goal setting and policy on formulation, but in a bureaucratic scheme, the emphasis is on execution. The emphasis on goal setting and policy formulation in a collegial model is unclear, but Baldridge (1971) suggests there is "probably more emphasis on formulation" (p. 25). The analysis of administrator evaluation at The University of Toledo

uses these aspects of Baldridge's political model, and employs the following operational definitions.

Politics

Bacharach and Lawler (1980) predicate their work "on the assumption that organizational life is dominated by political interactions; politics in organizations involve the tactical use of power to retain or obtain control of real or symbolic resources." Organizations like corporations, universities, and voluntary associations are "politically negotiated orders" in which actors constantly bargain and avail themselves of influence tactics for "Survival in an organization is a political act" (p. 1).

Power

Bacharach and Lawler (1980) state that power is a complex concept which "sensitizes us to certain forms and contents in a social relationship" (p. 14). They say the following about the form of power:

> Power must be embedded in the social relationship and not treated as an attribute of a single person, group, or organization. The relationship can and should be portrayed in terms of dependence. The patterns and degree of dependence are the basic parameters or context within which actors affect one another. Within the dependence relationship, actors confront the issue of when to use sanctions and whether sanctions will be effective with respect to the other party. (p. 26)

The same authors identify two content dimensions of power: authority and influence. They describe seven points of contrast between authority and influence, three of which are particularly useful in an analysis of administrator evaluation:

1. Authority is the static, structural aspect of power in organizations; influence is the dynamic, tactical element.
2. Authority refers to the formally sanctioned right to make final decisions; influence is not sanctioned by the organization and is, therefore, not a matter of organizational rights.
3. Authority is circumscribed, that is, the domain, scope, and legitimacy of the power are specifically and clearly delimited; influence is uncircumscribed, that is, its domain, scope, and legitimacy are typically ambiguous. (p. 44)

Quality

Like power, quality is a complex notion which at its heart concerns individuals and the values they attribute to acts and aspects of reality. Pirsig (1974) points out that it is an irritating, even angering concept for while it begs precise definition, it must be accounted for in any complete analysis of human action. Quality is to reality what influence is to power: the dynamic subjective element which necessarily complements objectivity, or in the case of power, which complements authority. When one takes quality into account, the following occurs:

> Reality isn't static anymore. It's not a set of ideas you have to either fight or resign yourself to. It's made up, in part, of ideas that are expected to grow as you grow, and as we all grow, century after century. With Quality as a central undefined term, reality is, in its essential nature, not static but dynamic. And when you really understand dynamic reality you never get stuck. It has forms but the forms are capable of change. (Pirsig, 1974, p. 277)

Pirsig claims that most people forget about quality--just leave it hanging suspended--for they get nowhere when they try to trap it in definition: "Quality . . . you know what it is, yet you don't know what it is. But that's self-contradictory. But some things are better than others, that is, they have more quality" (p. 178).

Quality is a slippery concept, but because it is that which breathes life into static reality, it is ignored in the structuring and analysis of human processes like administrator evaluation at the risk of desiccating both the process and the analysis.

THE CASE STUDY

Background

The University of Toledo's Faculty Senate periodically addressed the issue of administrator evaluation beginning in 1972. There was little continuity of effort, however, largely because the membership of the Senate, and hence of the standing committee responsible for the matter, changed annually. In the Spring of 1979, the Faculty Senate voted to have its Executive Committee appoint an ad hoc committee to recommend procedures and instruments for faculty evaluation of administrators. Accordingly, one faculty member from each of the three largest colleges was appointed by the Senate chairman; and two administrators were appointed by the President of the University.

The President had been asked to appoint two persons to the Committee, for it was realized by the Senate that the power of the President, by virtue of his authority, was great enough to scuttle the process simply by not participating. The President could de facto veto the effort, for both the administration and the faculty realized that the Senate factions could not successfully form a coalition influential enough to survive if pitted against the authority of the President.

It should be noted that as his Committee appointees the President chose two deans, not senior level administrators who would have brought to the process both greater authority and greater influence. In the same vein, the deans chosen were not the senior members of that group, nor were they deans of colleges with large numbers of faculty. In fact, the Dean of Business Administration had been at the University for less than half a year when he was appointed; and the Dean of Continuing Education is not responsible for a full-time faculty.

It became clear during the Committee's initial deliberations that recommendations and suggestions from faculty members and administrators would be useful to the Committee as it worked to develop a procedure appropriate to the particular institution. The Committee members also realized that the data gathered through solicitation of recommendations and suggestions from interested parties would increase the Committee's influence by allowing it to argue that its actions expressed the will of faculty members and administrators. Therefore, an information form was sent to members of both groups.

Forms were returned by 226, or between 30 and 40% of the potential faculty and administrator respondents. Of that number, 195, or 86% favored faculty evaluation of administrators. Fully 90% of faculty responses and 79% of administrator responses favored evaluation.

The ad hoc Committee reported the results of the information survey to the Senate and at the same time made it clear that the literature indicated that successful administrator evaluation programs generally involve various concerned constituencies, not just the faculty. The Committee concluded the first of three reports to the Senate by stating that successful programs are usually part of an overall institutional commitment to uniform assessment procedures, such as faculty evaluation. The Senate accepted the report with the Committee's recommendation to proceed to the next stage: the development of an evaluation instrument.

The instrument finally developed by the committee contained elements to make the evaluation both specific and open-ended in order to take into account quantitative and qualitative dimensions. A five point Likert scale was used to evaluate administrators in terms of administrative effectiveness, leadership, and interpersonal skills. A five point scale was also used for an overall rating. Faculty members were asked to comment on the principal strengths and weaknesses of the person in the position and to indicate additional criteria they felt should be used in future evaluations. Last, they were asked to make comments about the instrument and the process itself.

All full-time tenure-track faculty members were eligible to participate in the evaluation, except for those holding administrative positions above the level of department chairman. Each eligible member was to evaluate his or her department chairman and college dean, and three University-wide administrators. (Department chairmen were to evaluate only deans and University-wide administrators.) The assignment of the three University-wide administrators was made on a random basis.

Those evaluated included 47 department chairmen, 8 deans of units with full-time faculty members, and 10 University-wide administrators. The latter category included President, Executive Vice President, Vice President for Business Affairs, Vice President for Student Affairs, Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dean of the Graduate School, Director of University Libraries, Dean of University College, Dean of Continuing Education, and Dean of Student Affairs.

The Committee consistently emphasized that the assessment procedure was being initiated as an aspect of institutional development, and the hope was expressed that by providing administrators with information they might not have, the University might ultimately benefit. The anonymity of the process was also stressed. Administrators were to see only a summary of their individual evaluations, and the information was to be available to no one other than that individual.

Faculty Response

1. Evaluation materials were mailed to 600 faculty members, and 50% were returned for the evaluation of University-wide administrators, for college deans, and for department chairmen.
2. Of the individual forms returned for the evaluation of 10 University-wide administrative positions, 39% contained evaluations, while 61% indicated no basis for evaluation. There were written comments on 41% of the forms with evaluations. The range of completed evaluations by position (i.e., the percentage of those respondents who felt they had some basis for evaluation) was 21% to 81%. It is important to note that only in the cases of the President and Vice President for Academic Affairs did 50% or more of the faculty members indicate they had a basis for evaluating University-wide positions.
3. Of the individual forms returned for the evaluation of college deans, 97% contained evaluations, while 3% indicated no basis for evaluation. There were written comments on 49% of the forms with evaluations.
4. Of the individual forms returned for the evaluation of department chairmen, 97% contained evaluations and 3% indicated no basis for evaluation. There were written comments on 41% of the forms with evaluations.

Administrative Response

Administrators received a computer printout and summary of written comments pertaining to the evaluation of their positions. They were invited to meet with members of the Committee to discuss the results and the process, but none requested such a meeting. The Committee then sent a questionnaire about the process to those who had been evaluated, for it was felt that the successful continuation of such an assessment procedure would depend, to a large extent, on the critical advice of participants.

Of 54 questionnaires sent, 48% were returned. The process was said to be useful by 61% of the respondents, although 35% indicated there were problems with the procedure. Written comments about one or more aspects of the process were revealing, particularly because they echoed the written comments of faculty members.

From all levels--University-wide, dean, chairman--came remarks about the number or percent of faculty responses. University-wide administrators especially expressed concern about the validity of an evaluation of a position for which a majority of respondents indicated no basis for evaluation. There were suggestions in this regard that while the evaluation of administrators might be a good idea, constituencies other than the faculty might be in a better position to make appropriate judgments (e.g., deans might better be able to evaluate University-wide administrators).

Some raised questions about the problem of interpreting faculty responses. For example, one person pointed out that if very low ratings came from the best teachers and most active researchers, there would be cause for concern, even if the number were small. The interpretation would be different, however, if the criticism came from a group whose teaching performance was poor and research activities nonexistent. A number of people, both administrators and faculty, raised the question of whether faculty members had adequate knowledge on which to base an evaluation of many of the positions.

A few department chairmen said the process was unnecessary because they were already evaluated by the dean from above and the faculty from below. Similarly, some deans pointed out that they received written evaluations from the Vice President for Academic Affairs from above and were subject to periodic faculty votes of confidence from below. Taken together, these responses highlighted the issue of the extent to which an institution-wide administrator evaluation process would be duplicative, given existing procedures.

There were, not surprisingly, several comments about the instrument. A number of administrators, as well as faculty members, questioned the validity of summaries based on just a few written comments. Others commented on what they saw as the problem of using a norm referenced, rather than a criteria referenced, instrument. Many made suggestions about how the evaluation categories should be changed.

Observations and Recommendations

Following the completion of the project, the Committee made these summary points:

1. In January 1980, the University's faculty members and administrators received a questionnaire which, among other things, asked whether the faculty favored faculty evaluation of administrators. Of the approximately 30% who responded, 90% of the faculty and 70% of the administrators indicated they favored such a process. In the evaluation, however, the faculty returned only 55% of the forms that were mailed; and of those, 40% had "No Basis for Evaluation" checked. Similarly, of the 54 administrators who received evaluation information, only five in any way responded to the Committee's first invitation to comment on the process, and then only informally. About half returned the questionnaire which was subsequently mailed to solicit information about administrators' perceptions of the process. These statistics suggested that on the part of faculty members and administrators there was less willingness to participate in the process than there was initial enthusiasm for the idea. While the Faculty Senate initiated the process, and while the University administration agreed to limited participation, there was compelling evidence that a substantive commitment to such an assessment procedure did not exist.
2. If administrator evaluation is to be successful, it must be part of a general University commitment to an assessment process which includes the uniform,

regular evaluation of faculty. Certainly the Faculty Senate can promote and carry out a project of administrator evaluation, but its full potential for helping improve the University cannot be realized unless the administration is an equal, enthusiastic, committed partner. To repeat a previous point, there needs to be something more substantive than a agreement to cooperate. Similarly, more faculty than a few members of the Senate must be willing to spend the time and to make the compromises necessary to institute a uniform, equitable, but never perfect process of looking at themselves. Without such a balanced approach, different sorts of evaluation will perhaps temporarily placate one group or another without providing the information necessary to improve the performance of administrators and faculty alike.

3. If the Faculty Senate were willing to approach the University administration to jointly work on the general problem of assessment, the Committee felt it would be appropriate and beneficial to form an ad hoc committee on University faculty and administrator evaluation. The Committee cautioned that if the Senate decided to procede, the experience of the previous years--with administrator evaluation addressed in fits and starts--indicated the need to act promptly. Delay, it was clear, would only increase the chance of losing the fragile momentum and interest that had been developed.

ANALYSIS

There is little doubt that neither the University administration nor the Faculty Senate wants to pursue administrator evaluation as part of a general institutional commitment to uniform assessment. In the three months following the Committee's final report, there was no formal communication about the matter between the Senate and the administration, between the Senate and the Committee,

or between the administration and the Committee. Only in passing were a few remarks made, comments exchanged. Baldridge's framework helps one understand "what happened?"

It is no secret that colleges and universities epitomize configurations of social groups "with basically different life-styles and political interests" (Baldridge, 1971, p. 23). More importantly, groups in colleges and universities often have fundamentally different conceptions and understandings of reality. These differences are characterized by Mitroff and Kilman (1978) in the distinction between the "analytic scientist" and the "conceptual theorist." Mitroff and Kilman paraphrase the analytic scientist's argument this way:

> "To know" is to be certain about something. Certainty is defined by the ability to "phrase" or enumerate the components of an object, event, person, or situation in a precise, accurate, and reliable fashion. Therefore, knowledge is synonymous with precision, accuracy, and reliability. Any endeavor that cannot be subjected to this formula or line of reasoning is either suppressed, devalued, or set aside as not worth knowing or . . . doing . (p. 33)

This group is opposed by conceptual theorists, who are described in these terms:

> . . . the CT [i.e., conceptual theorist] believes that nature must be treated holistically and conceptually. Instead of there being a single, all embracing, precise, internally self-consistent paradigm to treat all of nature's diverse phenomena, the CT believes that one must have recourse to many explicitly conflicting paradigms. (p. 55)

Clearly, ideological differences which exist between theoretical and applied academic areas, or those which exist between disciplines, hamper joint action. True believers may have their view of the world so fixed by a particular paradigm as to make any meaningful communication impossible. Ideological differences make joint faculty action difficult in colleges and universities during the best of times. In the worst of times, marked by depressing demographics and sorry economic circumstances, such differences are highlighted.

The social structure at The University of Toledo is complex and under myriad stresses. Clearly, social conditions are not conducive to cooperative action on issues which demand wide participation. This is true especially in the case of sensitive issues which involve the threat of potential shifts of power. Administrator evaluation is just such an issue because the prerogative to assess the performance of a person implies some sacntioning authority.

Baldridge's second point of analysis is the process of interest articulation. There is no question that in the present case, the action of the Senate to form an ad hoc Committee was a response to a faculty interest which had been maintained over time. The participation of the administration indicated the level of its interest. The request that the President appoint two members of the Committee and his compliance implicitly acknowledged the groups' mutual dependence, although neither ever fully accepted the symbiotic nature of the undertaking.

Specific aspects of different interests were considered at length in meetings of the ad hoc Committee and consumed most of that group's energies. The members struggled to accommodate conflicting values and goals in developing an instrument and structuring a complete process. The group worked well together, but its efforts were compromised by irreconcilable antagonisms in the institution's social structure, antagonisms frequently reflected in the predispositions of individual Committee members. Economic issues, especially the related issues

of collective bargaining and differential salaries, were largely responsible for the antagonisms which existed and for muddying the process of interest articulation.

Collective bargaining had been much discussed at the University for about a decade, and over that period, proponents and opponents had solidified their positions. It is not surprising that positions taken on that issue prejudiced much of the discussion about administrator evaluation, since both issues pivot on questions of the distribution of power.

Similarly, faculty groups were separated by the issue of salary structure. While the Colleges of Law, Engineering, and Business Administration argued vociferously for differential salary structures, others, such as the Colleges of Arts and Sciences and Education employed the rhetoric of collegiality in defense of uniform salaries. Aspects of this issue also were reflected in discussions about administrator evaluation.

Interest articulation within the Committee was also hampered by the Committee members' lack of power. Those appointed by the administration had little authority to speak for that group, and those appointed by the Senate Chairman had little cumulative influence despite attempting to maximize that influence through use of the initial information survey.

The legislative stage is the point at which interests are translated into policies. In this case, a committee did meet; a commission (i.e., the Committee) did report; negotiators (i.e., Committee members) did bargain; but "powerful people" did not "higgle and haggle" about the eventual policy, as Baldridge (1971) suggests they must. Rather, as has been pointed out, the people who "higgled and haggled" in the Committee had very limited power.

The Committee recognized its severe limitations, and as a result, its efforts never moved to the fourth stage of the political model, formulation of

policy. The Committee only made observations and recommendations in a final report to the Faculty Senate, for policy development was not part of its original charge. Even if the Committee had been charged with the formulation of policy and with the execution of policy, the fifth stage, the task would have been impossible. Without a "sympathetic" social structure, without an "accurate" process of interest articulation, and without the participation of "really powerful" persons in the legislative stage, the effort was necessarily of a preliminary, not final nature.

All who participated consistently invoked quality both in defense of, and in opposition to, particular actions. The Committee avowed in its reports that its deliberations were catalyzed by quality. Those who critized the evaluation scales on the instrument testified that they were motivated by concerns for quality. Likewise, those who objected to using summaries of written comments made it clear that they were motivated not by political considerations, but by a genuine concern for quality in the evaluation process. The instrument was the best evidence that the Committee was willing to accept uncertainty as a condition of quality. The instrument's five general evaluation categories and the open-ended questions failed, however, to satisfy some persons who viewed greater analytic precision as an indicator of quality. Similarly, the low response rates throughout the process very much bothered others who also believed, or took refuge in, the notion that quality is synonymous with statistical precision. At an intellectual level, the battle of quality was fought between two identifiable armies. On one side were the forces of analytic science; on the other were the forces of conceptual theory, as these groups have been described above. The issue of quality was joined on a political level, in addition to an intellectual level.

Throughout the process, the ad hoc Committee made it clear that the purpose of administrator evaluation at The University of Toledo was to promote the development

of individual administrators and to improve the quality of administrator performance. The evaluation was not undertaken to redistribute power by using the results to impose new sanctions, to alter balances of influence and authority, or to shift economic resources between faculty and administrators. The Committee made this political decision because a majority of the members believed using such a process for individual and institutional development was more important than using it for any other purpose. Also, all Committee members knew well the limits of the group's power, and they realized that the process they developed could not be used for the redistribution of power.

The distinction between evaluation for development and evaluation for the potential manipulation of rewards and punishment remained an issue, however, despite the consistent posture of the Committee. Some faculty members simply could not reject an opportunity to "get the administration"; and some administrators could not believe that the real purpose was individual and institutional betterment. Such attitudes were part of the flawed social structure and contributed to the failure of interest articulation at the second stage of the Baldridge model. That suspicion should punctuate a complex process involving the allocation of power in difficult times is not surprising. Nor is it surprising that misperceptions about the political and bureaucratic nature of the institution contributed greatly to problems.

At The University of Toledo, many faculty members and administrators use the rhetoric of collegiality when they discuss how decisions should be made, goals set, or policies established. The frequent unwillingness to accept the political and bureaucratic structure of higher education institutions creates substantive problems when some think a decision about administrator evaluation should be made in a collegial forum, while others know that it will involve negotiations and bargaining, as real political power is marshalled.

Clearly, the University Faculty Senate functions as a political arena in terms of its "higgling and haggling" approach to goal and policy discussion. However, the ability of the Senate to execute policy is largely frustrated by legalities which support the authority of administrators and others (e.g., trustees) who have authority in the bureaucratic structure.

Two reasons for the lack of success of administrator evaluation at The University of Toledo stand out among many. First was the failure, or inability, of the faculty to join together to wield the collective power of influence and to fully involve those with the real power of authority. The Committee's initial attempt to increase its influence through use of the information survey was unsuccessful for the most part. This was a political failure. Second was the failure to better come to terms with, or to achieve consensus about, the issue of quality. This was an intellectual failure, one which typifies the ideological tugs-of-war that often immobilize academics and paralyze decision-making in academe.

Administrator evaluation in higher education is more important today than it ever has been. It is particularly important as it helps satisfy demands for both accountability and efficiency. Establishing such procedures will become more difficult, however, as groups compete for increasingly scarce resources. Political astuteness and a sophisticated understanding of the concept of quality will be necessary prerequisites for the development of effective programs.

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